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Abstract
We determine conditions under which a pure-strategy equilibrium of a mixed
Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly exists. In addition, we determine its pure-strategy equi-
librium whenever it exists and compare the equilibrium outcome with that of the
standard Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with only private firms.
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1 Introduction
In mixed oligopolies a public firm, which maximizes social surplus, competes with at
least one private firm. The literature on mixed oligopolies focused on quantity-setting
games (e.g. De Fraja and Delbono (1989), and Matsumura and Okumura (2013)) or on
heterogeneous goods price-setting games (e.g. Ba´rcena-Ruiz (2007)). A homogeneous good
price-setting mixed duopoly was investigated by Balogh and Tasna´di (2012).
Probably the mixed homogeneous good price-setting oligopoly has not been analyzed
so far because of the difficulties in characterizing and determining the equilibrium of its
standard counterpart with purely private firms. Although the equilibrium of the relatively
simple symmetric oligopoly game with identical firms was solved by Vives (1986), the
equilibrium of the general triopolistic case was obtained only recently, independently by
Hirata (2009) and De Francesco and Salvadori (2010). In case of n ≥ 4, the full characteri-
zation of the equilibrium is still undone but some of its important properties were derived
by De Francesco and Salvadori (2010), which enable us to compare the purely private
oligopoly with the mixed oligopoly in terms of social surplus.
While in the homogeneous good price-setting game with purely private firms a pure-
strategy equilibrium fails to exist for a wide range of capacities (see, for instance, Dasgupta
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and Maskin (1986) and Vives (1986)) we show that its mixed version has a pure-strategy
equilibrium for a much wider range of capacities. In addition, if the price-setting oligopoly
game with purely private firms has an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixed strategies, we
prove that the presence of a public firm is strictly social surplus increasing whenever in the
latter case a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, which holds if the public firm is sufficiently
large. Besides extending the results obtained by Balogh and Tasna´di (2012) from duopolies
to oligopolies another interesting feature of having more than two firms in the market is
that one Pareto inferior type of Nash equilibrium vanishes when we move from two to
more firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework,
in Section 3 we recall the results of De Francesco and Salvadori (2010), which will serve as
a benchmark in our analysis. Section 4 contains the characterization of the pure-strategy
equilibria.
2 The framework
The demand is given by function D on which we impose the following restrictions:
Assumption 1. D intersects the horizontal axis at quantity a and the vertical axis at
price b. D is strictly decreasing, concave and twice continuously differentiable on (0, b);
moreover, D is right-continuous at 0, left-continuous at b and D(p) = 0 for all p ≥ b.
On the producers’ side we have a public firm and n ≥ 2 private firms. We label the
public firm with 0 and the private firms with 1, 2, . . . , n. Our assumptions imposed on the
firms’ cost functions are as follows:
Assumption 2. The firms have zero unit costs up to their respective positive capacity
constraints k0, k1, . . . , kn, where k1 ≤ k2 ≤ . . . ≤ kn.1
We shall denote by P the inverse demand function and by pc the market clearing price,
i.e. pc = P (
∑n
i=0 ki) and p0, p1, . . . , pn ∈ [0, b] stand for the prices set by the firms.
For all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} we shall denote by pmi the unique revenue maximizing price
on the firm’s residual demand curve Dri (p) = (D(p) −
∑n
j=0,j 6=i kj)
+ taking the capacity
constraint into account, i.e. pmi = arg maxp∈[0,b] p ·min {Dri (p) , ki}.
Let us denote by pdi the smallest price for which p
d
i ·min{ki, D
(
pdi
)} = pmi Dri (pmi ) for
each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. Provided that private firm i has ‘sufficient’ capacity (i.e. pc < pmi ),
then if it is a profit-maximizer, it is indifferent to whether serving residual demand at
price level pmi or selling min{ki, Di
(
pdi
)} at the lower price level pdi . Clearly, pc, pmi and
pdi are well-defined, and it can be verified that p
c ≤ pdi ≤ pmi , pmi ≥ pmj and pdi ≥ pdj hold,
whenever Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied and 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n.
Now we define p̂c, p̂mi and p̂
d
i in the same way as p
c, pmi and p
d
i , except that we
assume that the public firm does not enter the market, i.e. p̂c = P (
∑n
i=1 ki), p̂
m
i =
arg maxp∈[0,b] p · min
{
D̂ri (p) , ki
}
, where D̂ri (p) =
(
D(p) −∑nj=1,j 6=i kj)+ and p̂di is the
smallest price for which p̂di ·min{ki, D
(
p̂di
)} = p̂mi D̂ri (p̂mi ). Note that pc ≤ p̂c and pdi ≤ p̂di
for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We assume that the firms play the production-to-order type Bertrand-Edgeworth game,
and therefore, the game reduces to a price-setting game since the firms can adjust their
1The real assumption here is that firms have identical unit costs since in case of production-to-order,
as will be assumed later, this is just a matter of normalization.
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productions to the demands they face. Regarding the employed rationing rule and tie-
breaking rule, we impose the following assumptions.
Assumption 3. We assume efficient rationing on the market.
Assumption 4. We assume that in case of price ties the firms setting identical prices
divide the residual demand in proportion to their capacities. However, each firm has the
option of giving up a part or the whole of its portion of residual demand in favor of the
other firms setting the same price.
It is clear that no profit-maximizing firm will give up the demand it is entitled to up to
its capacity constraint. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, as we will see later, the
public firm can lead the market to a socially better equilibrium by restricting its supply
at ‘sufficiently’ low price levels since it may discourage private firms matching its price
from raising their prices. For each firm i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let Ei mean the set of those firms
which set the same price as firm i. The definition of Li for firms setting lower prices is
analogous, so Ei = {j | pj = pi, j = 0, 1, . . . , n} and Li = {j | pj < pi, j = 0, 1, . . . , n}.
Thus, if p = (p0, p1, . . . , pn), k = (k0, k1, . . . , kn) and ∆0 (D,p,k) stands for the public
firm’s served demand, then
min
{
k0, (D(p0)−
∑
l∈L0
kl−
∑
j∈E0
j 6=0
kj)
+
}
≤ ∆0 (D,p,k) ≤ min
{
k0,
k0∑
j∈E0 kj
(
D(p0)−
∑
l∈L0
kl
)+}
must hold. Essentially, ∆0 (D,p,k) describes the public firm’s behavior of letting or not
letting other firms serve its market share. According to Assumptions 3 and 4, the demand
served by private firm i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is given by
∆i (D,p,k) =

min
{
ki,
ki∑
j∈Ei kj
(D(pi)−
∑
l∈Li kl)
+
}
if 0 /∈ Ei,
min
{
ki,
ki∑
j∈Ei kj−k0
(D(pi)−
∑
l∈Li kl −∆0 (D,p,k))+
}
if 0 ∈ Ei.
We shall denote by Sp(p) =
∑
{i|pi≤p} ki the supply curve and by p
s
p =
min {p ∈ [0, b] | D(p) ≤ Sp(p)} the price determining social surplus for any given price
profile p. The public firm aims to maximize total surplus given by
pi0(p) =
∫ D(psp)
0
P (q)dq.
As the private firms are profit-maximizers, their object function is
pii(p) = pi∆i (D,p,k) .
3 The benchmark
The following results concerning the purely private price-setting oligopoly will serve as a
benchmark:
Proposition 1 (De Francesco and Salvadori (2010)). For the purely private price-setting
oligopoly under Assumptions 1-4, the following statements are known.
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1. The only pure-strategy equilibrium of the game can be {pc, pc, . . . , pc}, which is an
equilibrium if and only if max{pd0, pd1} = pc.
2. Even in case of a mixed-strategy equilibrium, each firm will set a price equal to or
larger than max{pd0, pd1}. More precisely, max{pd0, pd1} is the lowest of the supports’
minima of the firms’ strategies.
Note that the second point necessarily means that in any mixed-strategy equilibrium
the social surplus must be lower than in a strategy profile where each firm sets price pd1.
4 Characterization of the pure-strategy equilibria
We analyze the following two-stage game: in the first stage the public firm choses a suitable
∆0 (D,p,k) (a strategy to decide when to share its demand with the private firms in
the second stage); in the second stage, after the private firms have been informed about
∆0 (D,p,k), a price competition takes place.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1-4 and pd1 > 0, price p
s
p must be positive in any pure-
strategy equilibrium if such an equilibrium exists.
Proof. Assume that pd1 > 0 and there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which p
s
p = 0.
Since pd1 > 0 implies
∑n
j=0,j 6=1 kj < a, and therefore it follows that firm 1 could still sell a
positive amount at a positive price; a contradiction.
From now on, we restrict ourselves to the case when pd1 > p
c, since when pd1 =
pc any pure-strategy equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to the market-clearing outcome
(pc, pc, . . . , pc), similarly to the purely private case.
Assumption 5. We only consider k and D(p) for which pd1 > p
c.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1-5 all private firms must set the same price in any pure-
strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that the private firms set at least two different prices in a pure-strategy
equilibrium p. Consider one of the private firms with the highest price: If its residual
demand is zero, its profit is also zero, and it could benefit by setting a positive price below
psp. If its residual demand is positive, any of the firms setting a lower price could increase
its profits by setting its price anywhere between the current highest and second highest
prices, hence p cannot be an equilibrium.
Henceforth, we shall denote by p∗ the common pure-strategy equilibrium price of the
private firms if such an equilibrium exists.
Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 1-5 in any pure-strategy equilibrium (p0, p
∗, p∗, . . . , p∗) we
must have that all the private firms sell their entire capacities.
Proof. Otherwise the profit could be increased by slightly undercutting p∗.
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions 1-5 in any pure-strategy equilibrium (p0, p
∗, p∗, . . . , p∗) we
must have that D(p∗) ≤∑pj≤p∗ kj.
Proof. Otherwise each private firm could increase its profit by slightly rising its price.
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We are now ready to specify the pure-strategy equilibria with respect to an arbitrary
∆0 (D,p,k).
Proposition 2. Assume that Assumptions 1-5 hold. Then the simultaneous-move game
can only have the following two types of pure-strategy equilibria:
p0 = p
∗ = P
 n∑
j=1
kj + ∆0 (D,p
∗,k)
 (PSE1),
where p∗ = {p∗, p∗, . . . , p∗} and which is an equilibrium if and only if pd1 ≤ p∗ ≤ P (k0),
∆0 (D,p
∗,k) = D(p∗)−∑nj=1 kj and pd1 ≤ p̂c.2 In addition, the strategy profile
p∗ = p̂c and p0 > p∗ (PSE2),
is an equilibrium if and only if p̂d1 = p̂
c ≤ P (k0).
Proof. Assume firstly that p0 < p
∗. In this case p∗ = pc is the only possible equilibrium
price due to Lemmas 3 and 4. However, since pc < pd1 because of Assumption 5, playing p
m
1
instead of pc would be strictly better for firm 1, hence no such pure-strategy equilibrium
can exist.
Now consider the case p0 = p
∗. Clearly only p∗ = P (
∑n
j=1 kj + ∆0 (D,p
∗,k)) with the
condition ∆0 (D,p
∗,k) = D(p∗)−∑nj=1 kj ≥ 0 satisfies Lemmas 3 and 4. The public firm
cannot increase social surplus, unless it is able to lower the private firms’ residual demand
to 0 by undercutting p∗, which is possible if and only if P (k0) < p∗. As the private firms
sell their entire capacities, they would not profit by lowering their prices. It is easy to see,
that due to the concavity of the demand function, any firm i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} can increase
its profit by rising its price if and only if pdi > p
∗.
When p0 > p
∗, p∗ = p̂c is the only price that satisfies Lemmas 3 and 4. Condition
p∗ ≤ P (k0) can be justified as in the previous case. The condition preventing the private
firms from switching to a higher price is also similar, but here we have to use p̂di instead
of pdi as the public firm does not compete with private firms unless they set a higher price
than p0.
Observe that since pdi ≤ p̂di , PSE1 always exists with an appropriately chosen ∆0
at price p∗ when PSE2 does. We consider PSE2 as an unlikely equilibrium, since it
implies that the public firm does not enter the market despite knowing that another
pure-strategy equilibrium with higher social surplus would be possible. Furthermore, any
PSE1 equilibrium price below p̂
c, if a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, weakly dominates
any PSE2 equilibrium price.
In order to maximize social surplus the public firm should choose ∆0 in a way that the
PSE1 type equilibrium price becomes as small as possible. Taking into consideration that
P
(∑n
j=1 kj + ∆0 (D,p,k)
)
∈ [pc, p̂c] is a function of ∆0, an optimal ∆0 for the public
firm, resulting in equilibrium price pd1, is given by
∆∗0 (D,p,k) =

min
{
k0,
(
D(p0)−
∑
l∈L0 kl −
∑
j∈E0
j 6=0
kj
)+}
if ∀i : pi ≤ pd1,
min
{
k0,
k0∑
j∈E0 kj
(
D(p0)−
∑
l∈L0 kl
)+}
if ∃i : pi > pd1,
2The latter condition is equivalent with D(p∗)−∑nj=1 kj ≥ 0.
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where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
PSE1 simplifies to p
∗ = pd1 with only one necessary and sufficient condition in case
of ∆∗0 since we can omit condition P
(∑n
j=1 kj + ∆0 (D,p,k)
) ≤ P (k0) by pdi ≤ pmi ≤
P (
∑
j 6=i kj) ≤ P (k0), which results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume that Assumptions 1-5 are satisfied and that the public firm choses
∆∗0. Then the simultaneous-move game can only have the following two types of pure-
strategy equilibria:
p0 = p
∗ = pd1 (PSE1),
which is an equilibrium if and only if pd1 ≤ p̂c. In addition, the strategy profile
p∗ = p̂c and p0 > p∗ (PSE2),
is an equilibrium if and only if p̂d1 = p̂
c ≤ P (k0).
Since under Assumptions 1-5 by Proposition 1 the purely private oligopoly has only
a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which no firm sets a price below max{pd1, pd0}, it follows
for the respective mixed oligopoly that it has a strictly higher social surplus whenever it
has a pure-strategy equilibrium and the PSE1-type equilibrium will be played. We have
already emphasized after Proposition 2 why a PSE1-type equilibrium is more plausible
than a PSE2-type one.
Comparing our result with the duopolistic case investigated by Balogh and Tasna´di
(2012), PSE1 and PSE2 correspond to their NE1 and NE3, respectively. Surprisingly,
the Pareto inferior equilibrium NE2 of the duopoly game vanishes in case of more than
two private firms.
Finally, it can be easily checked that k0 ≥ k1 implies the existence of a pure-strategy
equilibrium under Assumptions 1-5 and ∆∗0. Therefore, if the market is not competitive
enough to have a pure-strategy equilibrium, the state can increase social welfare by ac-
quiring a sufficiently large private firm and operating it as a public firm.
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